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The Povertyof Political Culture*
RobertW. Jackman,University
of California,Davis
Ross A. Miller,Santa Clara University

andLeblang(1996;hereTheanalysesreported
byGranato,
Inglehart,
overthestudiesthatwe examined
afterGIL) are a majorimprovement
in ourpaper.Especiallynotableis theirexplicitevaluation
ofthecultural
by endogenous
growth
explanation
againsta majorrival,as represented
modelsofscholarslikeBarro(1991),LevineandRenelt(1992),andHelliratesovera given
well (1994). These modelsregresseconomicgrowth
humancapital,andothervariables.It
periodon a setofinitialeconomic,
a significant,
independent
is inthecontext
ofsuchmodelsthatGIL report
ofculture
on growth.
effect
to therobustness
of theirestimates
contrasts
GIL's attention
sharply
and Miller(1996). Theiranalysis
withthestudiesevaluatedin Jackman
in anotherway. In contrast
to Inglehart
departsfromrecenttreatments
ofculcomponents
(1990),forexample,whoexaminesthesevendifferent
tojusttwo:postmaterialism
turethatwediscuss,GIL restrict
theirattention
andachievement
motivation.
motivation
Theyfindthatonlyachievement
whichservesas thebasis fortheirconclusionaboutthe
affects
growth,
ofculture.
In thissense,theirworkstandsas a keyamendment
importance
onnormsoftrust,
torecent
studieswiththeiremphasis
satisfaction,
particito earlierwork,exemplified
most
pation,andthelikeandsignalsa return
(1961; 1963;
notablyby McClelland'sstudiesof needforachievement
norms
McClellandand Winter1969).Giventheexclusionof theformer
fromGIL's analysis,
forpostmaterialnonresults
alongwiththeirreported
motivation
as theonly"culism,we takeitthattheyregardachievement
Thisnarrows
tural"valueaffecting
economicgrowth.
thefielda gooddeal.'
Whilethere
is thusmuchtorecommend
their
paperoverprevious
work,
on boththeoretical
is ultimately
andemGIL's conclusion
unconvincing,
We addresstheseareasin turn.
piricalgrounds.
*We wouldliketothank
DonnaBahry,BruceBuenode Mesquita,
MaryJackman,
Stephen
Nicholson
andRandolph
Siverson
fortheir
helpful
suggestions,
andDuaneSwankforsharing
someofhisdata.We also acknowledge
support
fromtheInstitute
ofGovernmental
Affairs
andtheAcademicSenate,University
of California,
Davis.
'Recall(fromourTable6) thatInglehart
(1990)doesnotdiscussachievement
motivavalues.Sincesix of thesearenot
tion,butdoes addresssevenothermeasuresof cultural
addressedby GIL, we takeit thattheyare notnow seenas factors
thatmightinfluence
economicgrowth.
Recallfurther
that
(fromourTable 6) thatourownanalysisindicated
postmaterialism,
1980,did notinfluence
economicgrowth,
1980-88.
AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience,Vol. 40, No. 3, August1996,Pp. 697-716
? 1996bytheBoardof Regentsof theUniversity
ofWisconsin
System
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TheoreticalIssues
GIL's theoreticaldiscussionhingeson a ritualinvocationof Weber's
(1958) argumentabout Protestantism,
an argumentthatis centralto the
culturalaccount (Jackmanand Miller 1996; Fukuyama 1995, esp. chap.
5).2 Among otherthings,GIL claim that:
Thecultures
ofvirtually
all preindustrial
societiesarehostiletosocialmobility
andindividual
economicaccumulation.
Thus,bothmedievalChristianity
and
traditional
Confucianism
stigmatized
profit-making
andentrepreneurship....
Preindustrial
economies
arezero-sum
systems:
theyarecharacterized
bylittle
or no economic growth.... Weber's emphasison the role of Protestantism

seemstocapture
animportant
partofreality.
TheProtestant
Reformation
combinedwiththeemergence
of scientific
logicbrokethegripof themedieval
Christian
worldview
on a significant
partof Europe(1996,608-10).
Theiressentialstoryis thusas follows:Europe was economicallystagnant
throughout
theMiddle Ages and would have remainedso, had it notbeen
for the exogenous shock induced by the Reformationgenerally,and by
Calvinismin particular.Absentthatexogenousshock,economicactivityin
Europecould nothave movedfromone equilibrium(stagnation)to another
(growth).
This portrait
in everycrucialrespectwiththe
is, however,inconsistent
recordaccumulatedby historianssince at least 1945. Summarizingradically, thereis evidence of considerabletechnologicalchange,some indigenous and some borrowedfromAsia, duringthe Middle Ages (i.e., the
periodfromAD 500 to AD 1500). This innovationwas of sufficient
magnitude to lead Gies and Gies (1994) to conclude thatthe Europe of 1500
would have been unrecognizableto thosewho had lived at the beginning
of the millennium.
Second, therewas a sustainedpatternof economic growthduringthe
Middle Ages, one thatinvolveda generalexpansionof commerce,trading
and banking,and a patternin whichthe pre-Reformation
Churchparticipated. Accompaniedby populationgrowth,thiseconomicexpansionmay
nothave raisedlivingstandardsfrom"high to higher,"buttheshift"from
very low to less low" was nonethelessboth sustainedand remarkable
(Reynolds 1961, 156).

2Forgoodmeasure,
theyalso invokeTawney(1926). Thisbracketing
ofTawneyand
Weberis odd,however,
giventhatTawneyargued(contrary
toWeber)thatreligious
activity
was inherently
inimicalto economicgrowth.
Thus,Tawney'sexplanation
of economic
growth
aftertheReformation
emphasized
theerosionof religiousauthority
not
generally,
theemergence
ofdoctrinal
modifications
associatedwithCalvinism
or anyotherparticular
theology.
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Third,
therecordindicates
thatProtestantism
generally
(especially
Calvinism)didnotplacean unambiguous
andoverriding
weighton achievementnorms.It is indeeddifficult
evento sustaina clearcontrast
between
Calvinism,Lutheranism,
and Catholicismin the importance
thateach
to achievement
norms.Thus,itis unclearhowProtestantism
attached
(or
couldevenplausibly
Calvinism)
havebeena principal
stimulus
thatgeneratedcapitalism.
Fourth,
therewas an exogenousshockthataffected
patterns
of economicgrowth,
butthiscameas theBlackDeath(orPlague)andassociated
thatEuropelostat leastone-third
of
events,duringwhichit is estimated
itspopulation,
andafterwhichlandandgrainpricesplunged.Further,
the
in thelateMiddleAges(in themid-fourteenth
BlackDeathoccurred
century),
thechangeswiththeReformation
thatconcerned
predating
Weber.3
Weber'sempirical
analysis,
however,
started
withthefifteenth
century.
Notrecognizing
thisas thetailofa trough
ineconomicactivity,
heinstead
backto thetwelfth
on theerroneous
extrapolated
andthirteenth
centuries,
thattheymusthavebeen"even morerudimentary
assumption
andprimitive" thanthefifteenth
(Gilchrist
1969,126). Had he understood
thefifteenth
as theendofa trough,
itmighthavebecomeclearthatthe
century
ofcapitalist
"new" forms
toCalvinist
activity
he attributed
theology
were
in factmuchless novelthantheyotherwise
appeared.Weber'shistorical
fromtheselection
biasassociatedwithcensored
analysisthussuffers
time
series(Geddes1990),thecensoring
inthisinstance
atthebeginoccurring
ningoftheseries.Oncethisis recognized,
thebasisforGIL's initialpremise evaporates:
theirhistorical
claimssummarized
aboveareinaccurate
in
as is theirconclusion
that"Weberis correct
in arguing
everykeyrespect,
thattheriseof Protestantism
is a crucialeventin modernizing
Europe"
(1996,609).
EmpiricalIssues
GIL's dependent
variablecoverstheyearsfrom1960 through
1989,
LevineandRenelt(1992).Theirdataon initialGDP andon prifollowing
maryandsecondary
schoolenrollment
ratiosarefor1960("thebeginning
3There
is,ofcourse,a voluminous
literature
thataddresses
theseissues,thecumulative
implications
ofwhichundermine
theempirical
basisforWeber'shistorical
thesis.Theabove
discussion
drawsonBarrow(1990),Bossy(1985),Bridbury
(1992),Britnell
(1993a,1993b),
Britnell
and Campbell(1995), Carus-Wilson
(1967), Cipolla(1980), Cohen(1980), Day
(1987), de Roover(1963, 1974),Epstein(1991), Gilchrist
(1969), Gies and Gies (1972,
1994),Hatcher
(1986,1994),Hunt(1994),Lehmann
andRoth(1993),Lopez (1976),MacKinnon(1988,1994),McNeill(1977),MillerandHatcher
(1995),Outhwaite
(1986),Persson
(1988),Reynolds
(1961),Samuelsson
(1961),Titow(1994),Trevor-Roper
(1972,esp.chap.
1), White(1978),andWright
(1982).
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dataoninvestwhiletheir
emphasize),
ofthetimeperiod,"as GIL properly
89. In stark
mentratesare averagedovertheyearsfrom1960 through
valuesaredrawn
components
ofcultural
contrast,
dataforthetwomeasured
aremeasured
from
theWorldValuesSurveyfor1990. Thatthesevariables
onlyinthenotestoGIL's
for1990maynotbe obvioussinceitis reported
in thetextand
AppendixTable 1. The subjectis notbroachedelsewhere
whomaketheusuallyplausibleassumption
hencemayescapethosereaders
variablestemporally
varipredatethedependent
thatall theexplanatory
able.4
Perhaps labelling Culture1990as a "significantpredictor" of

(as do GIL) is less awkwardthanwe believe. Indeed, were
Growth1960-89

theuse
thereevidencethatthevaluesat handare largelytime-invariant,
as an approximate
be warranted.
might
ofCulture1990
proxyforCulture,960
andMiller(1996) indicates,
however,
thatthese
TheevidenceinJackman
of bothlong-and
overtime,as a function
valuescan varysubstantially
short-term
(see also ClarkeandDutt1991;Clarke,Dutt,andKorpatterns
1995).GIL
andInglehart
nberg1993;Duch andTaylor1993;Abramson
themselvesemphasizethat "centralelementsof culturecan and do
is an inadequate
andGIL's
proxyforCulture1960,
change."Ifso,Culture1990
A traitmeasured
at timet
cannot
empirical
analysisis simplyindefensible.
at timet,1.
be usedto explainan "outcome"measured
At thesametime,thereis another
wayto evaluateGIL's argument.
dataonnational
levelsofneedforachieveMcClelland(1961,90) provided
emphafor1950.Thesedataarebasedoncodingsofthemes
mentcollected
fromsecond-through
levfourth-grade
readbychildren
sizedintextbooks
els,andarefullydiscussedbyMcClelland(1961,chap.3). The 1950date
as thechildren
forthesefigures
is almostidealforourpurposes,
exposed
circa1950wouldbe adultsandatleastpotential
laborforce
tothesereaders
rolein
important
members
by 1960,andtheywouldplayan increasingly
economicpatterns
overtheensuingyears,1960-89.McClelland's1950
examinedbyGIL.s
dataare availablefor19 of the25 countries
4A seriesofWorldValuesSurveyswerealso carriedoutbetween1981and 1983,but
and
analyzedbyGIL (Abramson
thisearlierseriesdidnotincludesevenofthe25 countries
Brazil,
in 1981-83are Austria,
notsurveyed
Inglehart
1995,97-9). The sevencountries
andTurkey.
China,India,Nigeria,Switzerland,
estimates
for1925.In fact,he was
needforachievement
also reported
5McClelland
Considerthefollowing:
to issuesof temporal
ordering.
especiallyattentive
withsubsequent
ecocorrelated
[1925]arepositively
ofn Achievement
Theestimates
level
so.... On theotherhand,n Achievement
andverysignificantly
nomicgrowth
The
as estimated
fromthe 1950readersis notrelatedtopreviouseconomicgrowth.
because
inthetwosetsofcorrelations
is particularly
theoretically
important
difference
Marxappearstohavebeensomewhat
determinism....
itbearsontheissueofeconomic
in history
in dismissing
(McClelland
as a majordeterminant
psychology
premature
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Table 1. Regressionsof EconomicGrowthon InitialGDP,
and Need for
SchoolEnrollment
Ratios,Investment,
(t-ratios);N = 19]
Achievement
Levels,1950 [Coefficients
Robust
Regression

Median
Regression

-.35
(3.1)
1.66

-.38
(4.8)
1.22

-.32
(5.4)
1.03

(1.6)

(1.7)

(1.6)

OLS
GDP percapita,1960
Primary
education,1960
Secondaryeducation,1960
Investment,
1960-89
Need for achievement, 1950
Constant

R2
F-ratio

2.57
(3.5)
9.49
(2.7)

2.29
(4.4)
10.85
(4.3)

2.16
(5.4)
10.13
(5-9)

(0.2)

(0.3)

(0.5)

(0.5)
.61
6.68

(0.3)
n/a
15.09

(0.2)
.55
n/a

-.06

- .65

-.06

- .24

-.07

- .09

Dataarefrom
andLeblang(1996,Appendix
Table 1),andfromMcClelGranato,
Inglehart,
package.
land(1961,90). All calculations
aremadewiththeSTATA statistical

Table 1 displaystheestimates
obtainedwheneconomic
Accordingly,
onGDP percapitaandschoolenrollgrowth
rates,1960-89,areregressed
mentratios,1960,domestic
1960-89,andMcClelland'smeainvestment,
columnshowstheOLS estisureofneedforachievement,
1950.The first
of
are shownin the
mates,whiletwo alternative
robustsets estimates
s
columns.
Theseestimates
remaining
employGIL' data,andtheregression
their
Table 1,model3, exceptthattheN is 19rather
modelcloselymatches
than25.
acrosscolumns,it is evidentthattheestimates
are quite
Comparing
estimating
robust,in thesensethattheyare similaracrossthedifferent
well,
procedures.
Second,thecore endogenous
growthmodelperforms
for
ofcases.Onlythecoefficient
estimates
evenwiththereducednumber
with
schoolenrollments
areof borderline
statistical
significance,
primary
t-ratios
Third,and
justabove1.5 (notethattheyremaincorrectly-signed).
mostimDortant.
effect:
thereis noevidencehereofa needforachievement
1961,93, italicsin original).
Evenso, hisconclusions
aredifficult
to sustainin lightof analyseslikeBarro(1991) and
Levineand Renelt(1992). Amongotherthings,
McClellandreliedheavilyon zero-order
correlations.
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the relevantcoefficientestimatesare incorrectlysigned and the t-ratios
hoverbelow 0.5. In otherwords,whenachievementmotivationis analyzed
on thebasis of a defensibletemporalorderingof the measuredvariables,
thereis no evidence thatit influenceseconomic growthone way or the
other.
Given thisnoneffect,
how can we accountfortheconnectionbetween
growth,1960-89, and values, 1990, describedby GIL? This questionis
best addressedin termsof thealternative
perspectivesketchedin Jackman
and Miller(1996) thatdrawson analyseslike Hirschman(1984) and Gambetta(1993) thatendogenizevalues. Recall thatin GIL's analysis,achievementmotivationis gauged froma question asking respondentsto rank
"qualities whichchildrencan be encouragedto learnat home." It is said
to increasedirectlywiththeproportion
stressing"thrift,
savingmoneyand
things,"and "determination,"while it also increasesinverselywiththe
proportionemphasizingthe traditionalsocial values of "obedience" and
"religiousfaith."
Our hypothesesare straightforward.
First,economicgrowthgenerates
higherlevels of achievementmotivation,
thusdefined,because it createsa
climatewherenormsfavoringsavingand "determination"make sense. In
contrast,savingis oftensuboptimal(and indeedthereare fewerincentives
forsaving) in periodsof poor economicperformance
withtheirtypically
higherratesof inflation
and unemployment.6
in human
Second, investment
capital generateshigherlevels of such achievementmotivationinsofaras
itfostersthediffusion
ofachievement-oriented
normsand undermines
more
"traditional"social values.We anticipatethiseffecttobe mostpronounced
withinvestment
in secondary(as opposed to primary)education,theclientele forwhichis closer to adulthoodand thuscloser to enteringthe labor
force.
These two hypothesesare readilyevaluatedusingthedata reportedby
GIL in theirAppendixTable 1. Table 2 displaysestimatesobtainedwhen
achievementmotivations,1990, are regressedon economic growthrates,
1960-89, and school enrollmentratios,1960. The OLS estimatesin the
firstcolumn of the table are consistentwithboth hypotheses.Economic
growthhas themostpronouncedpositiveeffect,and has a t-ratioconsiderably greaterthan2.0. Both of the estimatesfor school enrollmentratios
arepositive,exceptthattheprimaryschoolenrollment
coefficient
is smaller
thanits standarderror.The t-ratioforthesecondaryenrollment
coefficient
is greaterthan 2.0, and the estimatedcoefficientitselfis fourtimesthe
size of thatforprimaryenrollment
variablessharea
(thesetwo right-hand
6GILrecognize
the"possibility
thateconomicgrowth
might
be conduciveto thrift,"
butassertthattherationale
forsuchanargument
is "less obvious."Theassertion
is puzzling.
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Table 2. Regressionsof Need forAchievement,
1990,on Prior
EconomicGrowthand InitialSchoolEnrollment
Ratios
[Coefficients
(t-ratios);N = 25]
OLS
Economicgrowth,1960-89
Primary
education,1960
Secondaryeducation,1960
Constant
R2

F-ratio

.22
(4.8)
.20
(0.7)
.81
(2.9)
-1.16
(4.2)
.69
15.45

Robust
Regression

Median
Regression

.19
(3.6)
.21
(0.6)
.88
(2.6)
-1.14
(3.4)
n/a
10.12

.17
(3.6)
.15
(0.5)
.95
(2.7)
-1.08
(3.4)
44
n/a

Data arefromGranato,
andLeblang(1996,Appendix
Table 1).
Inglehart,

commonmetric).Overall,this simple model fitsthe data quite well (the
adjustedR2 is .64 and theSEE is .28). Columnsthreeand fourof thetable
displayrobustestimatesforthe model,and show thatthe parameterestimatesare relativelystableacross different
estimators.
Beforewe embracethepropositionthat"achievementnorms" are the
phenomenongeneratedby theexplanatoryvariablesin Table 2, however,
one remainingempiricalissue warrantsclarification.The measure employed by GIL is generatedfromaggregateresponsesto only fourof the
11 itemslistedin theAppendixbelow. Specifically,GIL (a) sum thepercentageof respondentsin each countryemphasizingthevirtuesof "thrift,
saving moneyand things" and "determination,"(b) sum the percentage
of respondents
stressing"obedience" and "religiousfaith,"and thensubtract(b) from(a). The implicitassumptionhere,of course, is thatthese
fouritemsconstitute
a singlecoherentclusterof attitudesacrossand within
countries,so thata highcountryscoreindicatesthatthereare manyindividuals who attacha highvalue to thrift
and determination
and who simultaneouslyplace muchless weighton obedienceand religiousfaith,etc. How
reasonableis thisassumption?
The first
columnofTable 3 displaystheloadingsfroma principalcomponentsanalysisof the fourmeasuresof achievementmotivationforthe
25 cases examinedby GIL. These estimatesprovidesome apparentevidence fora relativelycoherentclusterof attitudes,as the firstfactorhas
an eigenvalueof 2.48, and no additionalfactorswitheigenvaluesgreater
than 1.0 are extracted.The loadingsforthe firsttwo measures(thrift
and
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determination)
have the same sign (negative) and are relativelystrong
(-.82 and -.61, respectively).The loadingsforthethirdand fourthmeasures(religionand obedience) are also in theexpecteddirection(positive)
of the
and quite high(.84 and .85, in turn).The substantiveinterpretation
factorin the firstcolumnappearsconsistent,moreover,withGIL's argument:a countrywitha highfactorscore is one wherecitizensattachless
and determination
and place moreweighton religion
importanceto thrift
and obedience.
we findvery littleevidence of comparablepatterns
Unfortunately,
withinthesesame 25 countries.In fact,in onlythreecases (India, Nigeria,
theestimates
and SouthAfrica)do we findthesame pattern.To illustrate,
forNigeria are shown in the second column,and suggesta single-factor
solution.While theloadingsare weakerthanthosefoundin theaggregate
given thatthese involve individual-leveldata),
analysis(not surprisingly,
thefouritemsdo clustersimilarlyin theNigerianand aggregateanalyses.
For 22 of the25 countries,however,thereis no such structure
across
solutionis
the fouritems,and in fully17 of these25 cases, a two-factor
warranted(i.e., thereare two componentswitheigenvalues > 1.0). The
remainingthreecolumnsin Table 3 illustratethe diversityof factorsolutions. In both France and Mexico, for example, we obtain a two-factor
and determination
clusterintoone factorand religion
solution,wherethrift
and
and obedience clusterinto another,and wherethe loadings forthrift
are of oppositesigns! For Norway,in contrast,we do estidetermination
solution:however,theloadingsare incorrectly-signed
matea single-factor
and onlyone exceeds .60. At theindividuallevel,
(givenGIL's argument),
then,these fouritems fail to clusterinto the single coherentdimension
anticipatedby GIL foralmostall of the cases thattheyconsider.
Finally,recall thatthefouritemsexaminedin Table 3 are a subsetof
11
the itemslistedin ourAppendix.The principlesguidingGIL's selection
of thissubsetare,however,unclear.Why,forexample,is "determination
and perseverance"includedas partof the achievementsyndromewhen
"hard work" and "feelingof responsibility"are not?To save space, we
do notdisplaytheestimateshere,buta componentanalysisofall 11 (aggretherotated
gated)itemsacrossall 25 cases generatesthreefactors.Further,
"hard
on
the
have
work"
second
component(along
(varimax) loadings
treat
with "imagination" and "tolerance"), and thus counterintuitively
"hardwork" as distinctfrom"determination."The corresponding
componentanalyses of all 11 itemswithineach of the 25 countriesgeneratea
considerablemiscellanyof solutions,fewof whichare amenableto a clear
substantiveinterpretation.
We emphasizein Jackmanand Miller(1996) thatthecore of thepolitical cultureaccountaddressestheprevalenceof value clusterswithincoun-
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tries,clustersthatassume politicaland social meaninginsofaras theyare
widelysharedacross individuals.Thereis no evidenceof any such coherent clusteringin GIL' s data to warranteither their narrowerclaims
about achievementmotivationor theirbroaderclaims about politicalculture.

Summary
GIL's argumentthatculturedriveseconomicgrowthis unconvincing.

ofa role
onWeber'sexplication
likemostsuchclaims,itis predicated
First,
one beliedbythehistoricalevidence.
in economicgrowth,
forProtestantism
Second, GIL's empiricalanalysesare fatallyflawed.Specifically,

(a) the measureof theirprincipalexplanatoryvariableconstitutesan
ex post "predictor;"
(b) an ex ante measureof achievementmotivationhas no systematic
effecton subsequenteconomicgrowth;
(c) evidence suggeststhattheirmeasureof cultureis moreprofitably
cast as an outcomeof economicgrowth;and
(d) themeaningof thatmeasureof cultureis obscure(GIL to theconas a unidimensional
gauge
trary,it certainlycannotbe interpreted
of achievementmotivations).

Swank's Commentary
orempirical
Swankdoes notaddressanyofthetheoretical
Remarkably,
issues discussedabove.7While the bulk of his commentsconcernculture
and economicgrowth,Swank addressesour reanalysisof Putnam(1993)
in onlytwo paragraphs,and his briefdiscussiondistortswhatwe say. For
we do not "suggest throughprincipal
example, Swank notwithstanding,
perforcomponentsanalysis at least four dimensionsof [institutional]
mance" (1996, 666). Instead,we employtheidenticaldata and estimating
thathe confusesassumptionswith
proceduresas Putnamto demonstrate
conclusions,and thatabsenthis strongassumptionsthereis no basis for
thatthedatingof GIL's measureof needfor
7Tobe sure,Swankdoes acknowledge
4, however,
comesonlyinhisfootnote
maybe an issue.Thisacknowledgement
achievement
Thus,he proceedsas if
oftheproblem.
thegravity
failsto recognize
andSwankobviously
twocolumns
variablewerenotan issue(as inthefirst
GIL's datingoftheirkeyindependent
neither
our
Swankto thecontrary,
Further,
discussion).
ofhisTable 1 andthesurrounding
willbe somewhat
norGIL's "suggeststhatthisvariable[needforachievement]
discussion
4).
stableovertime"(Swank1996,footnote
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thoseconclusions.8The pointis simple,fundamental,
and inescapable.Putnam's analysisfails on its own terms.9
Most of Swank's commentarycenterson the impact on growthof
"communitarian
politics." Ignoringhis own admonitionto avoid "singleequation,linear models of what theoretically
is a multifaceted,
complex
relationship"(665), Swank proceeds to estimatesuch models in which
communitarianism
is represented
by "corporatism"and "Confucianism."
We brieflydiscuss thesein turn.

Corporatism

Swank is selectivein his discussionof social corporatism,
and creates
the false impressionthatthereis a measureof agreementabout linkages
betweencorporatism
and economicgrowth.Thus,he citesLange and Garrett(1985) to thiseffect,butignoresthecriticismin Jackman(1987). Similarly,he mentionsHicks, who declaredthatwiththe additionof "several
keycontrolvariables" theLange-Garrett
model is "robust" (Hicks 1988,
677), but ignoresthe factthatHick's model is overfitted
and has meager
degreesof freedom(Jackman1989). Problemsof robustnessalso plague
theclaimsaboutcorporatism
advancedin Swank(1992), as shownby Beck
and Katz (1995), but Swank cites onlythe formersource.
In additionto thisselectivity,
Swank's measureofcorporatism
is weak.
Whilehe opinesthatcultureis "multifaceted,"he actuallyrelieson a simple dummyvariableto reflectthepresenceof communitarian
values. This
is too bluntan instrument
to measureadequatelythe "clustersof values,
attitudes,and normsthatsupport,and are reinforcedif not facilitatedby,
8Thus,
ourpurpose
hasbeentoshowthatPutnam's
owndatado notwarrant
theconclusionshedraws.We do notmeantosuggest,
however,
thatthisis theonlybasisforcriticism
ofhisinferences.
Forexample,
Putnam
tracesregional
ingovernance
differences
during
the
1980sbacktopatterns
ofcivicengagement
attheendofthelastcentury,
andoftentomuch
earliercivictraits.One reasonably
wondershow he wouldhave proceededhad he been
investigating
regional
differences
ingovernance
during
theMussolini
period,i.e.,the1930s.
Whatpatterns
ofcivic(dis)engagement
wouldthesehavereflected,
andwhenexactlywould
thosepatterns
havebeenmanifested?
9Swank'scomments
aboutspecification
arecompletely
In ourreanalysis,
extraneous.
we includePutnam's
indicator
ofeconomic
development.
Thiscomesfroma principal
components
analysisof six elements:
netincomepercapita,1972;grossdomestic
product
per
capita,1970;thesize,respectively,
oftheagricultural
andindustrial
workforces,
1977;and
thevalueaddedshare,respectively,
foragriculture
andindustry
1979.In lightoftheendogenousgrowth
andrelatedempirical
modelssuchas thosewe havediscussed,it is evident
thateachoftheseelements
provides
evidenceonpatterns
ofphysical
capitalandinvestment
within
Italy'sregions.
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institutions,
policiesand practices,"all partof a complexwholethatSwank
claims constitutea core explanatoryvariable(1996, 667).
Finally,Swank providesno evidencebeyonda vague referenceto the
"extantliterature"(1996, 672) to supporthis classificationforfullyhalf
of the noncorporatist
states(his Appendixshows missingdata for 10 of
these 20 cases). Given thislack of evidence,coupled withthe crudeness
of Swank's index of social corporatism,
one wondershow he developed
his classification.

Confucianism
We notedin Jackmanand Miller (1996) the tendencytowardex post
explanationin the culturalaccount.In his evaluationof a relatedcultural
interpretation
of development,Billig clearlystatestheproblem:
The viewof cultureexpressedby thenewcultural
determinists
tendsto be
thestatic,synchronic
versionbeyondwhichanthropology
has largelyprogressed....Notehowthelogicworks:thesewords-authoritarian,
individualistic,present-time-focused,
etc.-characterizethis thingcalled Hispanic
American
culture
andleadinexorably
tomaladaptive
typesofeconomicactivexistin thesharedconsciousness
ofHispanic
ity.Thesevaluesandattitudes
Americans
andresultin a businessethosthatobstructs
thetypeofenterprise
we see inmoresuccessful
onesthathavepriorcultural
countries,
presumably
traits
thatfoster
a better
kindofeconomic
Sincewehaveonlyrecently
activity.
becomeawareofwhatconstitutes
itmustbe thecase
goodkindsofactivity,
thatthosesocietieswhosecultures
thatkindwerepretty
encouraged
lucky;
theothers,
areflexible
well,letus hopetheircultures
enoughto getwiththe
program
(1994,661,italicsin original).
And so it is withConfucianism.Weber,of course,wentto greatlengthsto
distinguishPuritanismfromConfucianism:"Confucianrationalismmeant
rationaladjustment
to theworld;Puritanrationalism
meantrationalmastery
of theworld" (1951, 248). Indeed,to providefurther
substantiation
of his
argumentin The ProtestantEthic,he devotedtheentirelast chapterof The
Religionof China to thecontrastbetweenthetwo worldviews. The theme
is echoed in morerecenttreatments.
Thus, accordingto Pye:
The Confucian
ideal was eminently
foran agrariansocietybut
appropriate
tothedevelopment
wasdetrimental
ofcommerce
andindustry.
the
Eventually
Confucian
tradition
ofdistrust
forall thatmight
unsettle
theagricultural
order
workedagainsttheChinesein theirconfrontation
withthemodemindustrial
andtechnologically
oriented
West(1991,34).
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A major difficulty
withthisdescriptionis thatit squares poorlywith
the recenteconomic performance
of manyEast Asian economies.There
are, of course,different
ways of resolvingthedissonancethusintroduced.
One might,forexample,concludethatthereis no causal linkbetweenvalues and economicgrowth.Anothertack,perhapsmoreconsistentwithFestinger(1957), involves an about-faceon the contentof Confucianismto
renderthe latterconsistentwiththe patternof economic growthalready
observed.Such is thestrategy
proposedby punditslike Kahn and endorsed
mostrecentlyby Swank:
Mostreaders... arefamiliar
withtheargument
ofMaxWeberthattheProtestantethicwasextremely
usefulinpromoting
theriseandspreadofmodernization.Mostreaders,
willbe muchless familiar
however,
withthenotionthat
has gradually
in thelasttwodecadesthatsocietiesbaseduponthe
emerged
Confucian
ethicmayin manywaysbe superior
to theWestin thepursuit
of
industrialization,
affluence,
andmodernization
(Kahn1979,121,italicsours).
The "thing" labelled Confucianismis now refurbished
as a pro-growth
value system,and thebasis fortheEast Asian economic "miracle" is thus
revealed.The ex post reasoninghere is glaring.

Swank's EmpiricalAnalyses
Thereremains
Swank's"theoretically
driven
empirical
model,"which
he claims"does surprisingly
wellin explaining
cross-national
variations
in economicgrowth
ratesandis robustin thefaceof alternative
controls
and statistical
evaluations"(1996, 675). Whatcan we learnfromthis
model?
Table4 displaysfoursetsofOLS estimates.
Thefigures
incolumn(1)
contain
theestimates
forthebaselinemodelofeconomic
withwhich
growth
GIL begantheiranalysis.Column(2) showstheestimates
obtainedwhen
thetwodummy
variablesforCorporatism
andConfucianism
proposedby
Swankare addedto themodel,and are similarto thosehe reports
in his
Table 1,column(3), exceptthattheyincludeinsignificant
estiparameter
matesforsecondary
ratiosandinvestments.
enrollment
thetwo
Comparing
weseethatthecoefficients
forthetwodummy
columns,
arestatisvariables
ticallysignificant
beyondthe.10 level(two-tailed
test),andthattheiradditionto themodelimprovesitsfitsubstantially
(forexample,theR2increases

from.63 to .87). Thiswouldappearstrongly
consistent
withSwank'scon-

clusions.

RecallthatSwank'sclaimis thatbothCorporatism
andConfucianism
haveseparate,
additiveeffects
on growth.
As is shownin column(3) of
Table4, however,
we findno evidenceofa corporatism
on growth
effect
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Table 4. OLS Regressionsof EconomicGrowthon InitialGDP,
and
SchoolEnrollment
Ratios,Investment,
OtherSundryCharacteristics
[Coefficients(t-ratios); N = 25]

GDP percapita,1960
Primary
education,1960
Secondaryeducation,1960
Investment,
1960-89
"Corporatism"

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-.63
(4.3)
2.69
(2.1)
3.25
(3.2)
8.12
(1.8)

-.30
(2.7)
3.30
(3.9)
.32
(0.4)
-1.41
(0.3)
.69
(1.8)
2.98
(5.7)

-.61
(3.8)
2.43
(1.8)
3.38
(3.2)
10.13
(1.8)
- .26
(0.5)

-.72
(0.7)
.63
8.58

.48
(0.7)
.87
20.10

-.84
(0.7)
.64
6.64

-.29
(3.3)
1.64
(2.0)
.45
(0.7)
2.53
(0.8)
.34
(I. 1)
2.39
(5.4)
-1.34
(3.5)
1.50
(2.3)
.92
29.76

"Confucianism"
"Failed Protestant
colonies"
Constant
R2

F-ratio

and Leblang(1996,AppendixTable 1), and fromSwank
Data fromGranato,Inglehart,
(1996).

forConfucianismis constrainedto zero: indeed,the
when the coefficient
applicableestimateis incorrectly
signedand smallerthanitsstandarderror.
A similarsetof estimatesis obtainedwhenthesetof Confucianeconomies
is excluded fromthe analysis and the model in column (3) reestimated
(figuresnot shown). Swank's estimatesthusappear to be less robustthan
he believes,and a comparisonof columns(2) and (3) in Table 4 suggests
that"Confucianism" is the deus ex machinaof his analysis.
Furtherperspectiveon theissue comes froman additionalvariable.As
Swank observes,the 25 economies underconsiderationencompasssome
non-Western
economies. Among these are threeformerBritishcolonies,
missionaryefforts
during
withinwhichtherewere considerableProtestant
wereultimately
and earlytwentieth
centuries.10
Such efforts
thenineteenth
unsuccessful,however,as most people in thesecolonies did not convert,
is extensive.
See, e.g., Ajayi (1965), Du Plessis
"0Theliterature
on theseactivities
(1899).
(1899),Ross(1986),andStewart
(1911),Duvall(1928),Messmore
(1903),Mitchell
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therebyrejectingthe entrepreneurial
values highlightedby Weber. We
would on the averagethusexpectlower growthratesin theseeconomies.
Column (4) of Table 4 reportsthe OLS estimatesfor a model containinga dummyvariablethatidentifies
these"failed Protestant
colonies."
Comparingthesefigureswiththosein column(2) showsthat"Confucianism" stillexertsa markedeffectwhilethecoefficient
for"failed Protestant
colonies" is also correctly
signedwitha t-ratioof 3.5. The fitforthemodel
as a wholeincreasesfrom.87 to .92, a statistically
significant
improvement.
Followingthelogic of Swank's analysis,we mighttherefore
concludethat
bothfactorsare important
to a completeexplanationof economicgrowth.
Cautionis in order,however.It is truethatthethreecountriesidentified
by Swank(China,Japan,and SouthKorea) areoftenlabelled "Confucian,"
eventhoughin religioustermsJapanand Korea are notpredominantly
Confucian(e.g., Pye 1985). It is also truethattheProtestant
missionsgenerally
failedin thethreecountrieswe have identified(India, Nigeria,and South
in a moregeneralsense has been successful
Africa),althoughChristianity
in SouthAfrica."These twobinaryvariablesare linked,however,in a more
fundamentalmanner.The so-called "Confucianism" dummy actually
identifiesthe threecases withthe threehighestscores on the dependent
variable, namely,economic growth,1960-89. Conversely,the dummy
variablewe have labelled "failed Protestant
colonies" actuallydesignates
thethreecases withthelowestratesof economicgrowth.These two "explanatory" variables are thussimplyrecoded versionsof the dependent
variable.
Swank's analysisbringsnew meaningto theproblemof selectingon
extremevalues of thedependentvariable.The difficulty
withselectingobservationsfor analysis on the basis of such values is well-known(e.g.,
Geddes 1990). Here, we are asked to go thenextstep.Identifya subsetof
suchcases and give thissubseta name(any namewill do). Createa binary
variablethatequals one forcases in thissubset,and zero otherwise,and
includeit on therightas an explanatoryvariable.Resultsare guaranteed,
and indeeditis notsurprising
that"Confucianism"drivesSwank's empirical analysis.Whetheror not these "Confucian" economiescomprisethe
Elect in a Calvinistsense,then,theycertainlyare theSelect.
Our additionof a parameterfor"failed Protestant
colonies" (forwant
of a shorterterm)servessimplyto roundout Swank's analysisand further
improvethefitby takingcare of thosecases withlow scoreson thedependentvariable.Underno circumstances,
of course,do suchefforts
constitute
"The threecountrieswe have identified
are unusualin anothersense: theyare theonly
threecases forwhichthecomponentsof need forachievementused by GIL clustertogether
in the manneranticipatedby GIL, as we indicatedabove (705).
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an explanation:economic growthis not usefullyexplained by itself.Instead,Swank's analysissimplyperpetuates
theexpost tendenciestypicalof
so manyculturalaccounts,and carriesthemto theirinescapableconclusion.

Conclusion
In lightof our evaluationof Inglehart(1990) and Putnam(1993) we
arguedthat"further
attemptsto refineand testthecase forpoliticalculture
along thelines we have addressedseem unlikelyto be productive"(Jackman and Miller 1996, 654). As we have shown here,neitherGIL's nor
Swank's analysesofferanymaterialevidenceto thecontrary.
Instead,they
serve solely to underscoreour originalconclusion.
The mostprominent
problemwiththeseanalyses(one theysharewith
manysuch analyses)is thattheyare ex post. This is an obvious issue with
Swank's invocationof Confucianismas a growth-enhancing
value (GIL
also broach the question). Since he wishes to attributethe high ratesof
growthobservedin theEast Asian Newly-Industrializing
Countries(NICs)
to values,Swanksummonsa common"Confucian" cultureas theexplanation.While it is a littlemoremasked,thesame predicament
plagues GIL's
inquiry.It is thusunsurprising
thateach analysisis also ex post in operational terms.GIL's key explanatoryvariablepostdatesthe phenomenon
theyseek to explain,while Swank's key explanatoryvariableis simplya
recodedversionof his dependentvariable.
Both analyses exhibita second generaldifficulty,
althoughit is displayed more directlyby Swank. The ecumenicaleffortto finda middle
groundbetweeninstitutional
and culturalexplanationsis not apt to prove
because thetwo are incompatible.We are hardlythe firstto note
fruitful,
theproblem.In an insightful
evaluationofrevisionists,
likeTawney(1926),
who soughtto modifythe Weber thesis,Samuelssonpointedout that:
Such writers,
disposedto compromise,
evidently
believethatfalseconcepts
can be madeintoperfectly
sensibleonessimplybytakinglittlebitsofeach
an glueingthemtogether
intoa "between-the-two"
or "as-well-as"joinery
of totally
opposednotions(1961,25).
treatedvalues as exogenous,and this
Weber,of course,fundamentally
is thedistinctive
elementofthe"value enactment"approach(Portes1976).
Analyseslike Putnam's,Inglehart's,and Swank's followverymuchin the
same tradition.In sharp contrast,the institutional
approachendogenizes
values (e.g., Hirschman1984; Knight1992; Gambetta1993). Because it
makesno sense to thinkof values as beinghalfexogenous,thisdifference
cannotbe split.
We could, of course,continueto draw rabbitsfromthe culturalhat.
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The more fruitful
strategy,however,involves institutional
analyses that
addresstwo basic questions.First,how do proceduresand rules structure
thechoices made by different
politicalactors?Second, how does political
conflictgeneratetheseproceduresand rules?The analysesin thissymposium have given us no reasonto departfromthese fundamental
political
issues.

Final manuscriptreceivedI December 1995.

APPENDIX
SurveyQuestionfromwhich"Achievement
Orientations"
are Generated
Hereis a listof qualitieswhichchildren
can be encouraged
to learnat home.
Which,if any,do youconsiderto be especiallyimportant?
Please chooseup to
five.(CODE FIVE ONLY)
A) Good manners
B) Independence
C) Hardwork
D) Feelingofresponsibility
E) Imagination
F) Toleranceandrespectforotherpeople
G) Thnift,
savingmoneyand things
H) Determination,
perseverance
I) Religiousfaith
J) Unselfishness
K) Obedience
Italicizeditemsincludedin GIL's (1996) indexof achievement
motivation.
Source:WorldValuesSurvey,1990(ICPSR study#6160),variables
#226-#236.
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